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Constitutional Law-Utility Shutoffs-A VIOLATIoN OF DUE PROCESS UNDER
COLOR OF STATE LAW? Palmer v. Columbia Gas Co., 342 F. Supp. 241
(N.D. Ohio 1972).
Past judicial decisions concerning the right of a private1 utility to termi-
nate-service for nonpayment of bills have consistently favored the utilit. 2
Yet victims of shutoffs, whether poors' or merely outraged and inconven-
ienced,4 continue to attack shutoff actions through the regulatory commis-
I This article deals primarily with the privately owned utility. For cases holding that
an action of a publicly owned utility is under color of state law, see Boman v. Birming-
ham Transit Co., 280 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1960) and Davis v. Weir, 328 F. Supp. 317 (N.D.
Ga. 1971).
2 For a collection of cases, see 1 A. PRISr, PRINciPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY REGUiLATION,
255-56 nn. 115-21 (1969); 43 Am. JUR. Public Utilities and Services § 64 n.4 (1942); 73
,CJS. Public Utilities § 6 nn.98 & 99 (1951); Annot, 112 A.L.R. 237 (1938); Note, The
Duty of a Public Utility to Render Adequate Service: Its Scope and Enforcement, 62
COLum L. REv. 326 n.90 (1962). But cf. Virginia Ry. & Power Co. v. House, 148 Va.
879, 139 S.E. 480 (1927), where a customer had not paid his bill when the utility collector
appeared at the former's residence seeking payment. Although the customer could not
immediately pay the collector, he sent the money later that morning to the company
office. That afternoon the service was shut off for nonpayment. The court held the
utility liable because the bill had been paid when service was discontinued.
3 In Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. Young, 116 F.2d 720 (10th Cir. 1940), the court
held that the utility owed the consumer no duty under the "humanitarian rule" to
refrain from turning off her gas in cold weather. The consumer, sick in bed as a result
of an automobile accident, could not pay her bill. Despite knowledge of the circum-
,stances and the consumer's promise to pay as soon as she could contact her son, the
'utility discontinued her gas service. The court held the utility not liable despite the
fact that the consumer had contracted pneumonia.
In Rock Cassell Gas Co. v. Kirk, 263 Ky. 149, 92 S.W.2d 10 (1936), although a
customer's six month old son died of pneumonia after the gas was shut off for nonpay-
mhent, the utility was held not liable. Other decisions have held similarly that the right
of the utility under contract to shut off service is paramount to the need of the con-
sumer. See generally Annot., 132 A.L.R. 914 (1941).
4 1n Union Enterprises, Inc. v. Seattle, 77 Wash. 2d 190, 460 P.2d 285 (1969), the
plaintiff alleged that "the City of Seattle Light Co. wrongfully and negligently dis-
connected all power to the vessel-resraurant known as 'Surfside 9,' causing a chutdown
in electric pumps which were used to pump water from the bilge of the vessel, thereby,
causing the vessel, together with the equipment and fixtures, to sink to the bottom of
Lake Union whdre the same now lies in a partially submerged and permanently unusable
condition." On July 15, 1966, a notice was sent to the restaurant to pay its past due
bill by July 20; on July 21, the electricity was shut off. The court held that the
utility "made an entirely legal use of a method, effective, inexorable and direct. ..
Id. at -, 460 P.2d at 287.
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sions,5 legislation, 6 and the courts.7 Their efforts have met with failure in
all forums.
Anti-shutoff groups" have made a strong but unsuccessful effort to in-
volve the federal courts, first through the equal protection clause of the
5Only the District of Columbia Public Service Commission has announced a policy
that is somewhat unfavorable to present shutoff practice:
Termination should only take place after intensive efforts to effect collection
without so doing. The collection of arrearages should not be tied to arbitrary
time periods but should take into account the financial situation of the customer,
his willingness to meet his obligation, and his record in living up to his under-
takings.
The first question which arises is whether it is just and reasonable to allow
any termination of service for non-payment. We are fully aware of the hardship
which such action can cause and we believe that its use should be a measure of
last resort. We cannot, however, conclude that terminations should be prohibited.
To do so would place the Company in the position of having to sell its product
to all customers regardless of their credit experience. Doubtless, the great majority
of the Company's customers would regard their obligations to the Company
seriously and would refrain from taking advantage of its service. It would be
naive, however, not to recognize that there would be those who do not give
proper regard to their financial obligations and would exploit the Company's in-
ability to refuse to provide its service and product further. We think that the
properly exercised power to terminate service is, entirely just and reasonable.
In re Washington Gas Light Co. (D.C. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1968), 1 CCH Pov.
LAw REP. 9229 at 12, as reported in 46 Wash. L. Rev. 745, 763 nn.81 & 82 (1971).
In Virginia, the State Corporation Commission's Electrical Division receives consumer
complaints about gas and electricity shutoffs. (Past complaints have involved only
cases in which the customer and utility had disputed payment of the bill.) After re-
ceiving a complaint, the Electrical Division contacts the utility involved, and requests
that service be continued or restored until the matter can be investigated. The utility
normally complies. It is doubtful that a disputed payment claimant would be entitled
to a hearing before the Commissioners, and a complaint of shutoff for mere nonpay-
ment would be dismissed without investigation by the Electrical Division. Interview
with C. Vaughn, Electrical Division, SCC, in Richmond, Virginia, Aug. 23, 1972.
6 Only the state of Washington has passed legislation allowing reduced or state sub-
sidized utility rates to indigent families. Shelton, The Shutoff of Utility Sersices for
Nonpayment: A Plight of the Poor, 46 WASH. L. REv. 745, 766 n.95 (1971) [hereinafter
cited as Shelton]. A few states authorize their welfare agencies to make direct payment
to the utility for an indigent's bill. 1 CCH Pov. L. REP. T 1515.73 (1972).
Few state legislatures have announced any specific policy concerning shutoff for
nonpayment. Tho Califuinia, Virginia, Kansas, Maryland, Indiana, New Jersey, New
York, and North Carolina Codes are silent on the subject. In Virginia, the SCC regu-
lates shutoff procedures, deriving authority from VA. CODE ANN. § 56-247 (1966). See
note 18 infra.
See note 2 supra.
8 These groups, largely poor peoples' organizations, view the payment of the utility
bill as a major problem, because the resulting utility shutoffs contribute to slum condi-
tions that in turn contribute to a high crime rate. Commission studies substantiate this
theory. Shelton, supra note 6, at 747 n.5 (1971).
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fourteenth amendment,9 and more recently through the right to due proc-
ess secured by the fifth and fourteenth amendments.' 0 However, in the
recent case of Palmer v. Columbia Gas Co.,'. the District Court for
northern Ohio, diverging from past reasoning,' 2 declared that an Ohio gas
utility's shutoff practices violated due process.' 3 The court found a basis
for jurisdiction in a provision of the Civil Rights Act 4 which makes illegal
the deprivation of any rights under color of state law.' 5 The right deprived
was that of due process' 6 owed the customer by the utility. The fact that
the utility was granted a monopoly to operate by the laws of the state,17
that the utility was regulated by a public commission,'8 and that the utility
9Lueas v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 322 F. Supp. 337 (ED. Wis. 1970). See also
Shelton, supra note 6, at 767 n.97 (1971).
10 Amendment V broadly states that "no person shall be deprived of... due process.
.' Amendment XIV directly applies this inhibition on the states: "nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law...
"1342 F. Supp. 241 (ND. Ohio 1972).
2 Lucas v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 41 U.S.L.W. 2087 (7th Cir. Aug. 2, 1972);
Kadlec v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 407 F.2d 624 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 846
(1969); Taglianetti v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co, 81 R.1. 351, 103 A.2d 67 (1954).
But cf. Davis v. Weir, 328 F. Supp. 317 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
13 "Thus there is no question of the entitlement involved. Neither is there any ques-
tion that the defendant's shutoff procedures, especially when actually followed up by a
shutoff, are clearly offensive to even the most elementary notion of what constitutes due
process." Palmer v. Columbia Gas Co., 342 F. Supp. 241, 244 (N.D. Ohio 1972).
'4 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
15 Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the depri-
vation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress. (Emphasis added.) Id.
1CWhile the nature and limits of due process are constantly changing, the courts
frequently note that:
Due process is not a mechanical instrument. It is not a yardstick. It is a process.
It is a delicate process of adjustment inescapably involving the exercise of judg-
ment by those whom the Constitution entrusted with the unfolding of the -process.
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 163 (1951).
17 OHfo REv. CoDE ANN. § 4905.24 (1971) prevents duplication of one utility's service
in an area by another utility so long as the first utility renders adequate service. The
Utility Facilities Act grants separate territory to Virginia utilities. VA. CoDE AN.
56-265.3 (1968),
18 O1o REv. CODE ANN. § 4905.04 (1969), VA. CODE ANNm. § 56-247 (1966), states:
If upon investigation it shall be found that any regulation, measurement, practice,
act or service of any public utility complained of is unjust, unreasonable, insuffi-
cient, preferential, unjustly discriminatory or otherwise in violation of the
law .... the Commission may substitute therefor such other regulations, measure-
ments, practices, service or acts and make such other order respecting, and such
change in, such regulations, measurements, practices, service or acts as shall be
just and reasonable.
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was empowered to shut off service for nonpayment by state statute,19 all
helped bring the utility's action under color of state law.20
. Two major issues arise in Palmer: what does due process require before
a utility can shut off service for nonpayment, and is a utility shutoff under
color of state law? Concerning due process, the court held that three
notices mailed to the customer over a period of two months and five days
were not sufficient 21 because a potential shutoff victim is entitled to personal
19 OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4933.12 (1969). Virginia has no equivalent statute.
The utility submits a disconnection policy to the state utility which may approve
or disapprove it. Some courts point to the fact that the utility can draft its own shut-
off regulations as evidence that the shutoff procedure is not under color of state law:
Motivated by purely private economic interests and pursuant to its own regula-
tions, Illinois Bell terminated plaintiff's Call-Pak service. The only apparent state
connection with the termination rests in the fact that defendant company filed
its regulations with state authorities; the state in no sense benefitted from, encour-
aged, requested or cooperated in this suspension of service. Kadlec v. Illinois
Bell Tel. Co., 407 F.2d 624, 626 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 846 (1969).
The Kadlec position seems clearly erroneous. While the utility may offer proposals, the
commission makes the final determination. A study of the utility tariffs on file with the
Virginia SCC reveals almost total uniformity in shutoff procedure for Virginia's numer-
ous gas and electric utilities. The Tariff submitted by the state's largest electrical
utility, Virginia Electric and Power Company, is representative:
TERMS AND CONDITIONS
XVI DISCONTINUANCE OF THE SUPPLY OF ELECTRICITY
(b) The Company reserves the right to discontinue furnishing electricity to a
Customer, with 5 days written notice from the Company to the Customer, upon
the occurrence of either one or both of the following events:
(1) For nonpayment of past due bills, regardless of any amount of money on
deposit with the Company.
(2) For failure to comply with any of the Company's Terms and Conditions
as filed with the Commission, or with any of the conditions or obligations
of any agreement with the Company for the purchase of electricity.
(e) Notice of discontinuance shall be considered to be given to a customer when
copy of such notice is left with the Customer, or left at the premises where his
bill is rendered, or posted in the United States mail addressed to the Customer's
last post office address shown on the record of the Company.
A simple test to determine the existence of a principal-agent relationship is to look
to the parties to see if they believe and act as if such a relationship does exist. While
VEPCO officials do not view the utility as the agent of the SCC, they do believe that
the SCC is responsible for its practices and procedures affecting the consumer. When
called to defend its practices, the utility merely points to the appropriate SCC directive.
Interview with R. L. Dale, Credit Manager, and A. B. Correll, Assistant Accounting
Manager, VEPCO, in Richmond, Virginia, Aug. 24, 1972.
20 In Palner, a specific statute allowed shutoff for nonpayment. Does this make the
court's ruling inapplicable to Virginia utilities that derive authority from SCC regula-
tions promulgated in accordance with state statute? See note 18 supra. There seems
to be no valid basis for distinguishing legislative authority granted in a one-step process
from that granted by a two-step process.
21 The procedure of the Ohio utility was to send a bill at the end of each month.
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or actual notice.22 Considering gas and electricity as basic necessities,2 3 the
r ourt felt that customer needs transcend the rights of the utility secured
by its form contract. 24 Likewise, the court condemned the utility's practice
If unpaid, a past due notice was sent with the next month's bill. Five days thereafter
a shutoff notice was sent to the customer indicating he had four days to pay. At the
end of the four days, if payment was not received, service was discontinued. Palmer
v. Columbia Gas Co., 342 F. Supp. 241, 243 (N.D. Ohio 1972). VEPCO follows this
procedure except that service is discontinued five days after the shutoff notice instead
of four days. See VEPCO Tariff, supra note 19.
I The Palmer court condemned the practice of estimating every other monthly bill
by computer because these estimates were consistently low. Thus, when a meter was
actually read the following month, a consumer's bill might be so high that were he
on a limited budget he might be unable to pay. Palmer v. Columbia Gas Co., supra at
243. VEPCO also estimates every other monthly bill by computer. Officials believe the
estimates are generally accurate, citing an abrupt change in the consumer's level of
usage as responsible for most low estimates. Interview with R. L. Dale, Credit Manager,
and A. B. Correll, Assistant Accounting Manager, VEPCO, in Richmond, Virginia,
Aug. 24, 1972.
22 The only notice required in Virginia is a letter mailed to the last address shown
on the utility's records. See VEPCO Tariff, supra note 19. The Palmer court stated:
The evidence also showed that when the collectors went out to shut off gas, they
frequently did so without any announcement whatever to the consumer, even
though the consumer was sitting right in his house, so that the first notice he
would have of the shut-off was that his house got cold, or his kitchen range
would not light... 342 F. Supp. 241 at 243.
VEPCO officials state that if a customer is at home, the collector may "knock on the
door"; if the customer pays, service continues. However, company policy does not
require the collector to inform the customer or give him a final opportunity to pay.
Whether this is done depends on the temperment of the collector, his work load and,
perhaps, whether the customer notices the collector on the premises. See note 21 supra.
23 Palmer v. Columbia Gas Co., 342 F. Supp. 241 (N.D. Ohio 1972). See generally
Shelton, supra note 6, at 746 n.3 (1971).
24 Since most utilities are granted a monopoly on service in a given area, a consumer
has no choice but to accept the terms of the utility's contract. Although ideally a con-
sumer is protected from posoble injustice by the presence of the public utility com-
mission, note the terms to which a consumer must agree in order to obtain electricity
from VEPCO:
TERMS AND CONDITIONS
XVI DISCONTINUANCE OF THE SUPPLY OF ELECTRICITY
(d) The Company reserves the right to discontinue the supply of elec-
tricity under any of the above conditions irrespective of any claims
of a customer pending against the Company, or any amounts of money
oa deposit with the Company as required by Section IX of these Terms
aid Conditions.
(f) Whenever the supply of electricity is discontinued in accordance
nerewith, the Company shall not be liable for any damages, direct or
indirect, that may result from such discontinuance. In all cases where
the supply of electricity is discontinued by reason of violation by the
customer of any of the provisions hereof or of any agreement with
the Company for the purchase of electricity, there shall then become
/
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of annually sending out over 120,000 notices threatening shutoff, while actu-
ally discontinuing service to only 6,000 customers.2 Although the court may
have mentioned this merely to substantiate its argument that the present
shutoff practice is unfair, the implication inescapably arises that the court
desired an end to the disparity between 120,000 notices and 6,000 shutoffs.
To achieve this result, the utility would have to abandon the shutoff notice
is a coercive means of collecting past due bills, and adopt the threat of legal
action.2
6
due and payable, in addition to the bills in default, an amount equal to
the monthly minimum charge for the unexpired term of the agreement,
not as a penalty, but in lieu of the income reasonably to be expected
during the unexpired term of the agreement.
Paragraph (d), reserving the right to discontinue service irrespective of any claim pend-
ing against the utility, seems clearly illegal. "It is settled, however, that the right to
discontinue service may not be used to coerce payment of an account if the customer
challenges in good faith either its correctness or his liability for the amount charged.!'
'I A. PRIEST, PRINCIPLES OF PuBLIc UTILITY REGULATION, 256 (1969); Annot., 112 A.L.R.
241 (1938); Note, 62 COLUM. L. REv. 312, 326 n.91 (1962); cf. Virginia Ry. & Power Co.
v. House, 148 Va. 879, 139 SE. 480 (1927). Contra, Lucas v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co.,
41 U.S.L.W. 2087 (7th Cir. Aug. 2, 1972).
In paragraph (f), the utility disclaims all liability for damages resulting from shutoff.
Such practice, when by a private corporation utilizing a form contract, has been in-
hibited by the courts. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 NJ. 358, 161 A.2d
69 (1960), noted in 75 A.L.R.2d 1 (1961); see MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y.
382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
-That the SCC sanctions and enforces the disclaimer in paragraph (f) strengthens the
argument that the utility action is under color of state law.
25 Palmer v. Columbia Gas Co., 342 F. Supp. 241, 242-43 (N.D. Ohio 1972).
26 Despite the important interpretation by the Palmer court in declaring that a shutoff
arises under color of state law, the decision's effect would mean little to the poor con-
sumer should the court intend only actual notice to satisfy the due process requirement.
This would mean that the poor would have their service shut off after rather than
-before actual notice. However, the court views due prccess as requiring additionally an
end to arbitrary action, and an end to the disparity between the number of notices
sent and the number of shutoffs actually made:
Mailing out a vast number of shut-off notices, only about four percent of which
were followed up by actually taking the action threattned, making no attempt
to give actual notice when so drastic an action was taken, and taking the action
arbitrarily without giving the slightest opportunity to question or dispute it,
even when it was unquestionably improper, are not the ingredients of due process.
Id. at 244.
To end the disparity between the number of shutoff notices and ictual shutoffs, the
utility must either curtail the use of the shutoff or of the notice. The shutoff notice
is a highly effective and coercive means of collecting money. Obvioisly, if the utility
is required to take thousands of past due accounts to court for collecion each month,
the expense and time lost to the utility, the court system, and the paying customer would
'be prohibitive. Nevertheless, this is precisely the procedure private cirporations must
follow, and the Palmer court finds the extra-legal power the utility ha in the shutoff
notice unfair:
When the defendant's collectors enter upon private property to carry out the
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In considering whether the shutoff was made under color of state law,
Palmer relied on Public Utility Commissioners v. Pollak,27 in which the
United States Supreme Court held that a District of Columbia transit com-
pany's decision to have piped-in music on its buses was in fact the decision
of the federal government.28  In coming to this conclusion, the Pollak
court did not merely rely on the fact that the utility was a monopoly
authorized by statute and regulated by a public commission, but empha-
sized that the appropriate public utility commission had intervened directly
into the matter by holding a hearing that determined the ultimate rights of
both the utility and the customer.29 In contrast, the Palmer court empha-
sized only that the Ohio Utility Commission had the right to hold a hear-
ing, and not that it did hold a hearing.30 Thus, the Palmer decision would
procedures necessary to shut off a customer's gas, they are acting in a govern-
mental capacity, and exercising the police power of the state. The action is not
analogous to a merchant telling a customer he can get no more merchandise
until he has paid for what he has already had. It is the action of a sheriff or a
constable executing a writ of replevin, or a writ of restitution, entering upon
private premises to deprive a person thereon of his possession or his goods. Id.
at 246.
If the utilities -are forced to abandon the threat of shutoff in favor of the threat of
service of process, the end result may be that the utility will have to obtain judgment
against the delinquent consumer, and even seek garnishment or a judicial sale of the
consumer's property before shutoff will be permitted. This puts the utility on a par
with private corporations, and assures the consumer of a hearing on the merits of his
case.
27343 U.S. 451 (1952).
281d. at 461-62.
29 We find in the reasoning of the court below a sufficiently close relation between
the Federal Government and the radio service to make it necessary for us to
consider those Amendments. In finding this relation we do not rely on the mere
fact that Capital Transit operates a public utility on the streets of the District
of Columbia under authority of Congress. Nor do we rely'upon the fact that,
by reason of such federal authorization, Capital Transit now enjoys a substantial
monopoly of street railway and bus transportation in the District of Columbia.
We do, however, recognize that Capital Transit operates its service under the
regulatory supervision of the Public Utilities Commission of' the District of
Columbia which is an agency authorized by Congress. We rely particularly upon
the fact that that agency, pursuant to protests against the radio program, ordered
an investigation of it and, after formal public hearings, ordered its investigation
dismissed on the ground that the public safety, comfort and convenience were
not impaired thereby. Id. at 462.
30 "However, as the Supreme Court held in Public Utilities Comm'n of District of
Colminbia v. Pollak, . . . operation under regulatory supervision of the Public Utilities
Commission is the key factor to be considered." Palmer v. Columbia Gas Co., 342 F.
Supp. 241, 245 (N.D. Ohio 1972). Palmer does not mention an appeal from the Ohio
Utility Commission, and the Ohio statute requires appeals from the Commission to go
to the Ohio Supreme Court. OHio REv. CODE AN. § 4903.12 (1971). The crucial
question is whether the Court of Appeals will view the failure of the Palmer court to
emphasize the need for a Commission hearing as erroneous, or accept Palmer as a new
trend.
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not seem to follow the requirements outlined in Pollak,3 1 and therefore
might not withstand review. However, the Palmer court may have con-
sciously gone beyond the scope of Pollak, because the line of argument set
forth by the district court is constitutionally and legislatively sound.
Certainly, the Palmer decision standing alone does not establish a trend.
But the committee reports and cases32 showing the harsh results of allowing
shutoff for nonpayment continue to grow, and faced with the taxpayer's
dissatisfaction with welfare programs, anti-shutoff groups have turned to
the only source of relief available-the federal courts. If the courts determine
that gas and electricity are necessities, and shutoffs inhumane, then clearly
a precedent and legal argument to the contrary will not protect the utilities.
Past case law is not in accord with the Palmer holding, but the argument
based on the Civil Rights Act and the fifth and fourteenth amendments is
impressive and sound. The right deprived is due process and it need not
be asserted that the shutoff is state action, but that it is merely under color
of state law. While Palmer goes beyond Pollak by not requiring a Com-
mission hearing, is it valid to distinguish between the right to exercise a
power and the actual exercise of the power, or to distinguish between the
right to hold a hearing and actually holding one? In either situation the
Commission control, influence and sanction is present, directly or indirectly.
K. C. W., II
31 The Pollak holding requires a Commission hearing in order to label the utility's
action as under color of state law. The result would make all those actions on which the
Commission has ruled state actions, and those actions taken without a hearing private
actions. This seems clearly arbitrary. The practical solution is to require the shutoff
victim to petition the Commission for a hearing after disconnection. Once the Com-
mission reviews the shutoff, the groundwork is laid for further appeal alleging violation
of due process under color of state law. But, can the consumer obtain a hearing before
the Commission? OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 4905.26 (1971) requires the Commission to
hold a hearing upon any complaint by any person. Virginia has no comparable statute,
and it is doubtful that a hearing would be granted to the consumer alleging shutoff
for nonpayment. See note 5 supra. Further, it appears that the SCC intends to follow
the holding in Lucas v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 41 U.S.L.W. 2087 (7th Cir. Aug. 2,
1972), noted in National Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs Bull. No. 33-1972, 18
(Aug. 14, 1972). Lucas held that the Wisconsin Public Service Commission was not
required to hold a hearing prior to discontinuance of electric service for nonpayment
of a disputed bill. See the discussion of VEPCO Tariff paragraph (d), note 24 supra.
Lucas rejected the theories that (1) the utility acted under color of state law outlined in
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970); and (2) the utility's present shutoff procedure violated due
process. The ramification of the Lucas holding is that with the Commission in the
position to refuse to hold a hearing, there is no way the consumer can meet the hearing
requirements of the Pollak decision needed to qualify the shutoff as under color of state
law. Thus, unless the Palmer decision, which does not require a hearing by the Com-
mission to label the shutoff as under color of state law, stands, the theory that shutoff
is under color of law may never achieve prominence.
3 2 See notes 3 & 4 supra.
